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Conformorality
A Study on Group Conditioning of Normative Judgment
Abstract How does other people’s opinion affect judgments of norm transgressions? In our study, 
we used a modification of the famous Asch paradigm (1951, 1955) to examine conformity in the 
moral domain. The question we addressed was how peer group opinion alters normative judgments 
of scenarios involving violations of moral, social, and decency norms. The results indicate that even 
moral  norms  are  subject  to  conformity,  especially  in  situations  with  a  high  degree  of  social 
presence. Interestingly, the degree of conformity can distinguish between different types of norms.
Keywords: normative judgments, moral norms, conformity, nonverbal communication
1 Introduction
What is  worse? Stealing from your neighbor,  tipping in  Japan or  spitting in  your  glass  before 
drinking? Most people will have no hesitation in answering this question. Perhaps, they may also 
explain that those behaviors involve different kinds of norms. The first situation seems to concern a 
moral norm, which holds in all cultures and whose normative force does not depend on people’s 
expectations and preferences. The second involves a social norm, which holds only in particular 
contexts and whose normative force depends on people’s expectations and preferences. The third 
example, similarly to the first one, involves a type of behavior that is likely to elicit a wave of 
disgust independently of context  or people's preferences and expectations, but just  like a social 
norm, it involves a matter of relatively low seriousness.
This intuitive taxonomy roughly  corresponds to  a  distinction  between different  kinds  of 
norms,  which  emerges  from  the  literature  on  normative  judgment  in  moral  psychology  (e.g. 
Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 2009; Haidt, Koller, and Dias, 1993; Nichols, 2002; Turiel, 1977). Although 
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there are differences in the way particular researchers individuate different kinds of norms, many 
would agree that there are features that distinguish moral, social and what can be called “decency 
norms.”  For  example,  Turiel  (1983,  2002)  and his  collaborators  (Nucci,  2001;  Smetana,  1993) 
proposed that people neatly distinguish between moral and conventional norms along four main 
features: (in)dependence on authority, scope, seriousness of violation and grounds for justification. 
According to this distinction, violations of moral norms would be judged as wrong independently of 
the pronouncements of authorities; moral norms would have universal scope, treated as holding in 
all  places  and  at  all  times;  violations  of  moral  norms would  be  judged as  seriously  bad;  and 
justification of such norms would refer to the harm or injustice suffered by the victim when they are 
violated. Conventional norms, by contrast, would be considered to be authority-dependent, limited 
in scope, their violations would be less serious than moral violations and their justification would 
tend to involve considerations such as the maintenance of social  order rather than the harm or 
injustice suffered by some victim.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the distinction between moral and conventional 
norms emerges early in human psychology, around three and a half  year, and is  present across 
different cultures (e.g. Turiel, 1983, 2002; Smetana, 1993; Nucci, 2001). The conclusion that is 
often drawn in the literature is that moral norms and conventional norms, as characterised by Turiel 
and collaborators, form different kinds of norms, which can be neatly distinguished by human moral 
psychology (see Nado et al., 2009, for a critical discussion).
Recent research has disputed this conclusion, indicating that the features that allow us to 
distinguish between different kinds of norms can be more subtle and intricate than what Turiel and 
colleagues suggested. Kelly et al. (2007), for example, showed that when experimental participants 
are asked to evaluate the violations of moral norms in cultures and societies far away in both time 
and space,  they often judge them to  be tolerable.  Moreover,  Nichols  (2002)  and Haidt  (2001) 
showed that disgusting behaviors may be perceived as seriously bad as moral transgressions, albeit 
they do not involve harm or injustice to others. Such disgusting behaviors might be governed by an 
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idiosyncratic  kind  of  emotionally-laden norms,  distinct  from moral  and social  norms (Nichols, 
2004), which we call “decency norms.”
Furthermore, judgments about certain types of normative behaviors, but not about others, 
may well  be more resistant to  group pressure.  Intuitively,  given that moral norms are typically 
assumed to be non-negotiable, we might expect that your judgment about, for example, stealing will 
be less easily affected by conformity, compared to a judgment about a social norm such as tipping 
or about a decency norm such as spitting in your glass before drinking. To our knowledge, it has 
never been experimentally investigated whether different kinds of norms can be distinguished by 
the  degree  to  which  they  are  affected  by  peer-group  judgment.  Answering  this  question  will 
contribute to make progress both in understanding which features allow our mind to selectively 
distinguish between different kinds of norms, and specifically how social cues impact normative 
judgment.
In light  of  previous  evidence  about  the  developmental  and cultural  robustness  of  moral 
norms, we hypothesize that the norms that are most resistant to peer-group judgment will be moral 
norms—as characterised by Turiel and collaborators. Norms that are the least resistant to peer-group 
judgment  will  be  social  norms—corresponding to  Turiel’s  conventional  norms.  With respect  to 
decency norms, if they are found to be significantly different from moral norms in their resistance 
to conformity effects, then, on the one hand, disgust might not be essential to moral judgment, and, 
on the other hand, disgust would probably be insufficient to lead people to morally disapprove of a 
behavior where no harm or injustice are involved.
To test these hypotheses, the present study employed, for the first time in moral psychology, 
Asch’s (1951, 1955) group conditioning paradigm. We compared participants’ individual judgments 
concerning  the  violation  of  moral,  social,  and  decency  norms,  to  the  judgments  the  same 
participants gave in the presence of other people expressing different opinions.
Finally, given that nonverbal, social cues such as eye contact, facial expressions and tone of 
voice seem to play a crucial role in defining in-group social identity and its prototypical (normative) 
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behavior (Hogg and Reid, 2006) as well as in facilitating reaching agreement within a group (Hiltz,  
Johnson and Turoff, 1986), we hypothesised that the degree of awareness of the other persons—so-
called social presence (Short et al., 1976)—in the group conditioning situation might have an effect 
on conformity. To identify the possible effects of available nonverbal display, we tested whether 
being unable to see and hear each other results in a lower degree of conformity.
2 Test of Material
The  test  of  the  experimental  material  consisted  in  evaluating  30  scenarios  that  described  a 
transgression  of  some  norm.  The  scenarios  were  based  on  examples  that  are  found  in  the 
philosophical and psychological literature. They included descriptions of behavior involving, for 
example, some injustice or harm to other people (for what we pre-experimentally took to be moral 
norms), the infringement of a mutual agreement concerning fairness, reciprocity or equity (for what 
we  took  to  be  social  norms),  and  behaviors  associated  with  physical  uncleanliness,  “creepy 
crawlies” or non-standard sexual practices (for decency norms). The aim was to test if the scenarios 
would be interpreted by the subjects as instances of moral, social, and decency norms, respectively.
In  the  test,  we  also  considered  the  potential  impact  of  personal  distance  to  the 
perpetrator/victim  of  the  norm transgressions.  One  could  argue  that  violations  that  personally 
involve the participant could trigger emotional processes (Greene et al., 2001, 2004) that might be 
difficult to evoke with a scenario-based experimental method. If that is the case, we might expect 
respondents to evaluate  differently scenarios  concerning strangers  (typically  employed in moral 
psychology) to those where the victim and the perpetrator are known to the respondent.
2.1 Method
Participants. Sixty-eight Dutch students (57 female) were recruited from the undergraduate 
student population at the Tilburg University. They were randomly divided between two conditions 
and received course credits for their participation.
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Design and Instrumentation. The test of the material had a 2 x 3 mixed design with Distance 
(scenario  concerned  a  stranger  as  opposed  to  a  friend/family  member)  as  the  between-subject 
independent variable and Norm Type (moral, social,  decency) as the within-subject independent 
variable. The 30 scenarios were presented in English and described violations of moral, social and 
decency norms (10 scenarios per Norm Type, see Table 2 for examples and Table 3 for a list of the 
transgressions employed, classified per type of norms with references to the literature they came 
from or were based on). The participants were asked to evaluate the scenarios with respect to the 
following four items, each operationalized in terms of a 7-point scale anchored at the ends with (1) 
strongly disagree and (7) strongly agree: Badness (“X’s behavior is very bad”), Disgust (“What X 
did  is  nauseating”),  Time/Place  (“In  a  different  time/place,  it  is  OK to  do  what  X  did”)  and 
Authority  (“If  the law allows it,  it  is  OK to do what  X did”).  These items were based  on the  
properties identified by Turiel (1977), Kelly (2007) and Nichols (2002) as characteristic features of 
different types of norms. In the Stranger condition, the scenarios concerned unknown individuals 
with invented names; in the Friend/Family condition, the names were replaced with phrases such as 
“your roommate,” “your best friend” or “your parents.”
Procedure. The test was administered online and presented as a study of Dutch taboo
subjects. The participants were invited to read each scenario as if it were describing a situation that
actually happened.
2.2 Results
We  analyzed  the  results  with  mixed  ANOVAs  with  Norm Type  and  Distance  as  independent 
variables and the score on each of the four items as the dependent variable. The data showed no 
significant main effects of Distance for Badness, F(1,66) = 2.945, p = .091, for Disgust, F(1,66) < 
1, p = .579, for Time/Place, F(1,66) < 1, p = .620, and for Authority, F(1,66) < 1, p = .521. There 
were also  no significant  interaction effects  between the variables  Norm Type and Distance  for 
Disgust,  F(2,132) < 1,  p = .430, for  Time/Place,  F(2,132) = 2.850,  p  = .061, and for  Authority, 
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F(2,132) = 1.959, p = .145. There was an interaction effect between Norm Type and Distance for 
Badness, F(2,132) = 4.527, p = .013, however, the effect was small (η2p = .064).
These  results  indicate  that  scenarios  that  involved  the  participants’ friends  and  family 
members were not judged differently than the scenarios involving strangers. The scales evaluated 
for  each scenario  distinguished between three Norm Types  as  summarized  in  Table  1.  For  the 
property  Badness,  Decency  and  Time/Place, the three types of norms differed significantly from 
each other: for  Authority, a pairwise comparison showed a difference between moral and social 
violations,  and decency  and social  violations,  but  no  significant  difference  between moral  and 
decency violations. Finally, we inspected the correlations between the scores assigned to scenarios 
within a Norm Type, using Badness for moral norms, Disgust  for decency norms and Time/Place  
and  Authority  for social norms. The analysis showed no outliers within the categories (scenarios 
that  would  be  negatively  correlated  with  other  scenarios  in  the  category  with  respect  to  the 
distinguishing property). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were α = .617 for moral violations on 
the  Badness-scale,  α = .814 for  decency  violations  on the  Disgust-scale,  and  α = .716 on the 
Time/Place-scale and α = .745 on the Authority-scale evaluated for the social norm violations.
2.3 Discussion
The results of the material test show that characteristic properties of three types of norm violations, 
which have been identified in the literature (the seriousness of the violation, its dependence on 
time/place and on an authority and the feeling of disgust it evokes) distinguish between scenario-
types employed in the test and thus validate our intuitive original classification of the scenarios, 
which was based on the literature. The participants were not more sensitive to scenarios involving a 
familiar  person compared to those concerning a stranger and the distinction was not  taken into 





Participants. Ninety-seven Dutch native speakers (66 female), all with a good command of 
English, between the ages of 19 and 49, were recruited from the undergraduate student population 
at the Tilburg University and received course credit for their participation.
Design and Instrumentation. The experiment had a mixed 3 x 3 design, with Norm Type 
(moral, social, decency) as the within-subject variable and Social Presence (high, low and control) 
as the between-subject variable. The questionnaire consisted of the 30 short scenarios described 
above and 10 distractors. The distractor items had content similar to the experimental items in that 
they involved different kinds of norm violations.
The participant's judgment was measured on a 7-point scale anchored at the ends with (1) 
“strongly disapprove” and (7) “strongly approve,” with participants indicating their acceptability 
judgment for each scenario, first in an individually completed online questionnaire and, two weeks 
later, in a group condition with three confederates. In  the  online  version  of  the  questionnaire, 
participants were also asked to indicate for each scenario if they were certain of their judgment 
(yes/no).
For the 30 experimental items, the confederates’ answers employed in the group condition 
were chosen using the mean of the participants’ answers in the first measurement, with two scale 
points added to the mean (in the direction opposite to the conventional answer). The confederate 
answers were unanimous on the 30 experimental items and differed for the 10 distractor items. In 
the control condition, participants merely filled out the online questionnaire twice with a two-week 
period in between. For the first measurement in the individual condition, we used two sequences of 
the online questionnaire to test for possible order effects. In the second sequence, the questions 
were presented in a reverse order.
Procedure. In the group condition with high social presence, the participants were seated 
together with three confederates and they could see each other’s expressions and hear each other’s 
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voice. In total, 24 students, both male and female, acted as confederates. The experimental leader (a 
female for half of the trials and a male for the other half) read each scenario and the participants  
gave their  answer in the order:  confederate 1 - confederate 2 - participant - confederate 3. The 
participants were informed that the answers they gave online were lost due to a server error and had 
to  be collected again.  In  order to avoid differences  in  cognitive load between the first  and the 
second measurement, the participants were supplied with the text of the scenarios on paper.
In the condition with low social presence, the participants were seated in front of a computer 
screen in the same room as the confederates but could not see their face. In order to exclude vocal  
cues, they all indicated their judgments for each scenario by selecting their answer on the screen,  
where both the scenarios and the answers of the confederates were presented. At the end of each 
session, the participants were interviewed and debriefed. None of the participants reported having 
difficulties in judging the scenarios.
3.2 Results
A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of judgments per scenario collected during the first measurement 
revealed  no  effect  of  presentation  order  on  participants’ judgments.  The  data  from  the  first 
measurement in all three conditions, summarized as the mean value of the participants' judgments 
per scenario, were used to examine the homogeneity of variance for the three types of norms. The 
Levene Statistic showed that the assumption of equal variances was valid, indicating no systematic 
differences in answer distributions.
In order to test if all three types of scenarios were judged with the same certainty, we first 
compared the categorical data indicating participants’ certainty of their approval judgments. There 
was no significant difference between the three scenario types,  χ2(2) = .16,  p = .920;  for most 
scenarios (92.7%), the participants indicated to be certain of their judgment.
In the subsequent analyses comparing the first and the second measurement, we excluded 
cases where the participant had the same judgment during the first measurement as the confederates 
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in the group condition (13% of the total of 2910 experimental trials, distributed equally over the 
three Norm Types).
We calculated Conformity (C) using the approval judgments given by the participants in the 
individual (M1) and the group condition (M2) and the confederates' opinion (O), as C = |O – M1| – |
O – M2|. A positive value of C represents instances where the participant's judgment shifted closer 
to the confederates' opinion, a negative number stands for cases where the distance increased and 0 
for cases where the distance remained the same.
Given that the dependent variable Conformity was not normally distributed (Shapiro Wilk’s 
tests < .05), we used nonparametric tests throughout. We first examined whether male and female 
participants  differed  in  their  overall  Conformity  scores  in  the  two  conditions  involving 
confederates. A Mann-Whitney U showed no significant effect for gender (U = 374.00, z = -1.43, p 
=  .154).  We used  the  Kruskal  Wallis  test  to  analyze  the  difference  between  the  experimental 
conditions with high and low social presence and the control condition. A Mann-Whitney test with 
Bonferroni correction showed that the condition with high social presence differed from the Control 
condition for all three Norm Types, as well as the Total Conformity. The condition with low social 
presence differed from the Control condition in the case of Moral and Decency Conformity, but not  
for Social Conformity and the Total Conformity (see Table 4).
In  order  to  examine  the  difference  between  the  three  Norm  Types  (moral,  social,  and 
decency) in detail, we used the Friedman test to compare the level of Conformity separately in the  
two experimental conditions, with high and low social presence. The analysis showed that the three 
Norm Types differed only in the condition with high social presence (χ2(2) = 7.09, p <.05), but not 
in the condition with low social presence (χ2(2) = 2.97, p = .227)—see Table 5. In the condition with 
high social presence, participants conformed the most to the scenarios describing social violations 
(Mdn = .600), compared to decency violations (Mdn = .546) and moral violations (Mdn = .400). 
Wilcoxon tests with the Bonferroni correction (effects reported at a .0167 level of significance) 
showed that Conformity to judgments of moral violations differed from Conformity to social (p = .
9
003, r = -.471) and decency violations (p = .008, r = -.417), but Conformity to judgments of social 
violations did not significantly differ from Conformity to decency violations (p = .187, r = -.160). 
Finally, we ran a secondary analysis of the consistency of answers across measurements, calculated 
as the absolute difference between the participant’s first and second measurement (independently of 
the  confederates’ answers).  The  results  showed  that  similarly  to  the  Conformity  measure,  the 
stability of answers was higher for moral scenarios compared to the other two types (see Table 6).
4 General Discussion
Earlier research in psychology has examined, on the one hand, the effects of authority on obedience 
and norm compliance (Milgram, 1963), in-group/out-group effects on moral behavior (Tajfel et al., 
1971), and the consequences of emotional cues on people's normative judgments (Schnall et al., 
2008; Wheatley and Haidt, 2005). On the other hand, research studies on humans and nonhuman 
primates have shown that both species tend to adjust their behavior and beliefs toward others in 
their social circles (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Whiten, Horner and de Waal, 2005). In humans, 
conformity can affect judgments  ranging from perceptual  line-length estimates (Asch, 1951) to 
more  complex  behaviors,  such  as  energy  saving  (Schultz,  Nolan,  Cialdini,  Goldstein  and 
Griskevicius, 2007).
Combining both threads of research on normative judgment and conformity effects in an 
original way, our experiment focused on understanding the effects of peer pressure on individuals'  
normative judgments. The results of our experiment indicate that while all normative judgments 
tend to be affected by peer-group judgment to some degree, the effect is the strongest for social and 
decency norms, which are most likely to be influenced by peer-group conditioning. Moreover, the 
effect  is  especially  pronounced in  situations  involving a  higher  degree  of  awareness  of  others, 
operationalized in terms of the availability of nonverbal display. The degree of conformity to other 
people’s normative judgment as such can then be used to independently motivate the distinction 
between moral norms and social norms proposed by Turiel and collaborators.
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Our findings are coherent with previous research both on conformity effects in computer-
mediated communication (Smilowitz et al., 1988; Bordia, 1997; Cinnirella and Green 2007; Laporte 
et al., 2010), as well as with studies conducted by Bicchieri (2008) and Cialdini et al. (1991) on the 
effects of expectations about other people’s compliance with a norm.
To explain our main results, it can be suggested that the predisposition we have towards 
conformism to common behaviors and shared opinions of our own group is counterbalanced by the 
robust influence that a specific kind of norms, that is moral norms, has on our mind. Accordingly, 
although cultural-evolutionary models suggest that conformity has adaptive value under a range of 
conditions (Henrich and Boyd, 1998), behavior and opinions that involve violations of moral norms 
are more insulated from conformity effects. For by conforming to behaviors and shared opinions 
that involve violations of moral norms, members of a group would not increase survival likelihood 
at  both  the  personal  and  the  group  level.  Hence,  the  degree  of  dependency  on  other  people's 
judgments makes it possible to reliably distinguish moral norms from different types of norms. On 
this  basis,  it  can  be  suggested  that  moral  norms  constitute  a  natural  kind  in  human  moral 
psychology.
Furthermore, the fact that decency norms appear to be less stable than moral norms lends 
support to critical reviews according to which there is weak evidence that disgust is a moralizing 
emotion  (Huebner  et  al.,  2009).  Although  disgust  may be  implicated  in  moral  judgment,  it  is 
probably neither sufficient nor necessary for moralization to occur (Royzman et al., 2009).
A number of variables, including group size, group composition in terms of gender and age, 
as well as cultural background of the participants may influence the outcome of group conditioning 
experiments  and  should  be  explored  in  future  studies  of  conformity  to  judgments  of  norms. 
However, if human psychology is selectively sensitive to recognize and implement moral norms, 
which might constitute a cognitive domain robust to conformity effects, then our main result should 
be found across different groups and cultures.
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The language of the experiment might also be a factor; in our study, we presented English 
scenarios to Dutch participants. Even though their knowledge of English was good, the fact that 
they were evaluating norm transgressions in a non-native language may have reduced the impact of 
our manipulation (Puntoni, de Langhe and Van Osselaer, 2008). Arguably, this might affect decency 
norms more than moral ones.
Additional research is also needed to validate the scenario-based technique employed here 
by linking it to behavioral data collected in natural and simulated (game) settings (Van Lankveld et 
al., 2011), possibly using methodology that has been previously employed to determine personality 
profiles.
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Table 1
Summary of the mean participants' judgments in the two survey conditions per item, measured on a  
7-point disagree/agree- scale (N=64).
Item Moral SD Social SD Decency SD ηp2
Badness 5.3 0.6 4.5 0.72 5.0 1.1 .30*
Disgust 4.9 0.73 3.7 0.96 5.9 0.79 .84*
Time/Place 2.9 0.72 3.7 0.86 3.3 1.1 .28*




Examples of experimental scenarios involving a violation of normative behavior
Norm Type Scenario
Moral One day Lauren invites Aaron to her place for tea. 
Aaron accepts even though he doesn't know 
Lauren very well. They are having their tea when 
Lauren has a sexual urge. She wants to have sex 
with Aaron. Aaron is not willing, he tells Lauren, 
tries to fend her off, but he can't. Lauren tears off 
Aaron's clothes and she has with him.
On a scale between 1 and 7 how stronly do you  
approve/disapprove of Lauren having sex with  
Aaron?
Social Michiru, Mauro and Robert are at the pub 
together. Mauro buys the second. When they have 
finished their second drink, Robert walks to the 
bar and buys a drink only for himself. Michiry 
and Mauro buy their drink only for himself.
On a scale between 1 and 7 how strongly do you  
approve/disapprove of Robert buying a drink only  
for himself?
Decency Susan usually has cereals for breakfast. One 
morning she realizes she finished her favorite 
cereals. She has only an old pack with grubs and 
insects inside. She puts them in a bowl and 
microwaves it first to kill the germs. Then she 
eats them:
On a scale between 1 and 7 strongly do you  
approve/disapprove of Susan eating cereals with  




Violations involved in the scenarios classified according to the Type of Norm
Moral 1. Getting drunk while being the designated driver
2. Wife cheating on her loving husband
3. Not paying taxes in Italy
4. Catching frogs and pouring boiling oil on them
5. Woman forcing a man to have casual intercourse
6. Harming the environment to increase profits (Knobe, 2003a)
7. Buying a luxury car during famine in Ethiopia (Singer 1972)
8. Not voting in EU elections with a low turnout
9. Keeping slaves 200 years ago (Kelly et al 2007)
10. Downloading music from the Internet illegally
Social 1. Having a sexual intercourse in a mosque
2. Not taking a vengeance for one's sister on Corsica (Elster 1990)
3. Coming to a dinner without a gift for the hosts
4. Enjoying rounds of drinks but not contributing (Elster 2009)
5. Not leaving a tip in a restaurant in the U.S. (Elster 2009)
6. Playing cards in a church during a funeral
7. Not sharing gained money during a game (Bicchieri 2006)
8.  Making a phone call in a cinema
9. Playing further after an opponent injured in a game
10. Leaving a shopping cart in the line to shop further (Elster 2009)
Decency 1. Eating parts of the deceased relatives' bodies (Kelly et al 2007)
2. Wearing a sweater that once belonged to Hitler (Rozin 2004)
3. Brother and sister making love (Haidt 2001)
4. Eating one's dog after it was killed by a car (Haidt 1993)
5. Eating cereals with insects for breakfast (Kelly 2011)
6. Sexual partners urinating on each other (Kelly 2011)
7.  Bathing in chicken blood (Haidt 1993)
8. Sheep ranchers having sex with sheep (Haidt 1993)
9. Growing worms in the bedroom and eating them (Kelly 2011)
10. Spitting in glasses before drinking (Nichols 2002)
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Table 4
 Mann-Whitney tests for the conditions with high social presence (N=33) and with low social  
presence (N=35) compared to the Control condition (N=29). The condition with low social  
presence differed from the Control condition in the case of Moral and Decency Conformity, but not  
for Social Conformity and the Total Conformity.
High SP Low SP
Conformity U p r U p r
Moral 297.000 .01 -.328 397.000 .13 -.188
Social 88.000 .00 -.701 297.500 .00 -.356
Decency 184.000 .00 -.529 464.000 .56 -.074
Total 116.000 .00 -.650 323.500 .01 -.311
Note. df = 2, SP = Social Presence
   
Table 5
Median Conformity differences in the three experimental conditions (low social presence, high  
social presence and control) by Norm Type (N=97). The scores express the change in distance to  
the confederates' opinion, higher score indicating higher conformity (0 = no change).
_______________________________________________________________________________
Condition               Statistics
                                               _______________________________________________________
Conformity High SP       Low SP           Control                    X 2                       p
_______________________________________________________________________________
Moral .40         .20         .00                7.100  .03
Social .60         .20                   .00                33.998  .00
Decency .55         .00         .10                21.065  .00
Total .52         .16         .00                          30.835           .00
Note. df = 2, SP = Social Presence
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Table 6
Results of the mixed ANOVA with the three experimental conditions and three norm types as  
independent variables and consistency of answers as the dependent variable (a higher value  
indicates less consistent answers), Norm Type: F(2, 188) = 9.95, p < .001, partial eta squared = .
10; Condition: F(2, 94) =6.24, p = .003, partial eta squared = .12; Norm Type * Condition n.s. A  
pairwise comparison analysis showed a significant difference between moral and social, and moral  
and decency norms, but no difference between social and decency norms.
_______________________________________________________________________________
       Condition
_______________________________________________________________________________
N With SP Without SP Control
____________________________________________
Norm Type Mean   SD Mean   SD Mean   SD
_______________________________________________________________________________
Moral 10 0.81 0.38 0.78 0.32 0.63 0.34
Social 10 1.08 0.41 0.92 0.43 0.73 0.31
Decency 10 1.06 0.50 0.82 0.31 0.76 0.43
________________________________________________________________________________
Note. SP = Social Presence
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